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An Auction with Rolling Horizon for Urban Consolidation Centre
Chen Wang, Stephanus Daniel Handoko, and Hoong Chuin Lau
School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University, Singapore
fcwang, dhandoko, hclaug@smu.edu.sg
Abstract—A number of cities around the world have adopted
urban consolidation centres (UCCs) to address some challenges
of their last-mile deliveries. At the UCC, goods are consolidated
based on their destinations prior to their deliveries into the city
centre. In many examples, the UCC owns a fleet of eco-friendly
vehicles to carry out the deliveries. A carrier/shipper who buys
the UCC’s service hence no longer needs to enter the city centre
in which time-window and vehicle-type restrictions may apply.
As a result, it becomes possible to retain the use of large trucks
for the economies of scale outside the city centre. Furthermore,
time which would otherwise be spent in the city centre can then
be used to deliver more orders. With possibly tighter regulation
and thinning profit margin in near future, requests for the use of
the UCC’s service shall become more and more common. In [1],
the authors proposed a profit-maximizing auction mechanism
for the use of the UCC’s last-mile delivery service. In this paper,
we extend that work with the idea of a rolling horizon to give
bidders greater flexibility in competing for the UCC’s resources
in advance. In particular, it addresses the challenge that many
shippers/carriers plan their deliveries many weeks ahead, and
simultaneously allows last-minute bidders to compete for the
UCC’s resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
Last-mile deliveries in urban areas exert serious pressures
on environmental, social, and economic well-being of a city.
These three aspects are usually referred to as planet, people,
and profit [2]. On the planet, the impacts are contributed by
the use of unsustainable natural resources like the fossil fuel.
On the people, the impacts are primarily due to air pollution
and noise. On the profit, the impacts include economic losses
because of traffic congestion and low utilization of transport
vehicles. Addressing these issues, local authorities may then
impose time-window or vehicle-type restriction. The earlier
complicates the scheduling of the last-mile deliveries from
the perspective of carriers/shippers. Quite-so-often, wait time
becomes inevitably necessary. Efficiency of the deliveries has
thus been compromised. The latter, on the other hand, forces
the carriers/shippers to operate small eco-friendly trucks for
deliveries into the city centre. These trucks, however, are not
efficient for long-distance inter-city transport. It is then clear
that one aspect may be affected while addressing the others.
Both the time-window and the vehicle-type restrictions affect
the profit while trying to address the planet and the people.
This prompts carriers/shippers to collaborate and consolidate
shipments for greater efficiency.
The urban consolidation centre (UCC) is an alliance
concept where oders served by various participating carriers
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get consolidated at the UCC. First, they are sorted according
to their destination addresses. Then, they are assigned to a
sufficient number of vehicles for the actual last-mile deliver-
ies. The cost savings obtained are finally shared among the
relevant carriers. As a consequence, higher truck utilization
is attained, fewer trucks are required, and lower delivery
cost is incurred. This effectively addresses the potential
inefficiency due to the time-window restriction. The possible
wait time suffered by those carriers assigned to carry out
the consolidated last-mile deliveries is compensated by the
savings attained by those carriers that no longer need to enter
the city centre. A fair allocation of the total savings earned
among participating carriers enhances the profit.
To-date, there have been a number of UCC establishments
with their own transport vehicles that are in compliance with
the rules and regulations set by local authorities. These UCCs
provide last-mile delivery service at a charge. Occasionally,
the UCCs may be governments’ initiatives or pilot runs and
provide last-mile delivery service free-of-charge. In essence,
carriers/shippers can simply drop their loads off at the UCCs
and pay the UCCs accordingly to get the loads delivered into
the city centre. Examples of these UCCs are La Petite Reine
in Paris, France, Westfield Consolidation Centre in London,
and Binnenstadservice.nl in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. This
addresses not only the time-window but also the vehicle-type
restrictions. By using the UCCs’ service, carriers/shippers no
longer need to enter the city centre. Retaining the use of large
trucks for the economies of scale outside the city centre thus
becomes possible. Besides, the time which would otherwise
be spent in the city centre may then be used to deliver more
orders. With these incentives, requests for using the UCCs’
service would intuitively become more common. The UCCs
could soon receive more demands than what they are capable
of serving.
To our knowledge, most—if not all—UCCs operate with
some fixed-rate mechanism on a first-come-first-serve basis.
We found no literature discussing the automatic matching
of orders to the available fleets of UCCs’ transport vehicles
for the efficient last-mile deliveries. We believe [1] to be the
first auction mechanism proposed for the last-mile delivery
via the UCC. Compared to the fixed-rate mechanism, the
proposed auction is distinctively aimed at achieving both
operational efficiency and economic viability—both of which
are important for the sustainability of the UCC.
The basic auction mechanism proposed in [1] is however
quite restrictive in that bidders are only allowed to compete
for the UCC’s resources in the immediate period following
Fig. 1. A rolling horizon framework.
the winner determination. In that paper, a period of one week
was observed. Indeed, one can argue that this is somewhat
unrealistic as many shippers/carriers plan for their deliveries
far in advance. To address this issue, not only the period
needs to be lengthened but the auction needs to be conducted
over a rolling horizon. This is as illustrated in Figure 1. The
UCC starts Auction #1 at the beginning of Week #0 and
accept bids for deliveries on Week #1 to Week #4. Prior
to the start of Week #1, the UCC determines the winning
bids for Auction #1. The UCC then starts Auction #2 at
the beginning of Week #1 and accept bids for deliveries on
Week #2 to Week #5, and so on. This gives greater flexibility
for the bidders in that the participating shippers/carriers
can choose to bid far in advance or in the last minutes.
A unlike the basic UCC auction model, there are some
overlap in the planning horizon of the UCC between two
consecutive auctions. Intuitively, there may be only a few
bids for deliveries on Week #4 in Auction #1. Profitable
consolidation may thus be impossible at the time the winners
of Auction #1 is determined. However, there should be more
bids to come for deliveries on Week #4 in Auction #2 to
Auction #4. Hence, profitable consolidation may in fact be
possible after the upcoming auctions. This suggests that the
UCC needs to be able to anticipate the potential revenue due
to future bids in the upcoming auctions. For deliveries on
Week #3, there may be enough bids to consolidate but some
of the bids have low bid prices. Rather than accepting bids
with low value to make profitable consolidation, it could be
better for the UCC to accept only highly profitable bids in the
current auction in the anticipation of other highly profitable
bids in the upcoming auctions.
Our contribution in this paper is an auction mechanism
with a rolling horizon that determines which demands are
to be served in the anticipation of future demands. This
is achieved by pricing the unused capacity, and our second
contribution is to propose how to price the unused capacity.
Note that this is not trivial problem, since the price should
not be too conservative nor too optimistic. We then verify
this through computational experiments. To our knowledge,
this is the first auction with rolling horizon in the context of
last-mile deliveries via the urban consolidation centre.
The remaining of this paper is then organized as follows.
Section II briefly reviews some related works on auction
in the logistics. Section III elaborates the basic auction
mechanism presented in [1] and forms the basis of our
extension described in this paper. Section IV proposes the
auction mechanism in elaborative manner. Mathematical for-
mulation of the augmented winner determination problem is
also presented therein. Experimental results are subsequently
presented and discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Auction has been commonly used in the logistics context.
Solving winner determination problems in logistics auctions
is often equivalent to solving scheduling problem in order to
minimize some transportation costs. Combining the services
provided by different providers to fulfill some deliveries can
be modelled as the set-partitioning [3] or lane-covering [4][?]
problems. Commonly, the models are mixed-integer program
(MIP) formulations with an objective of minimizing the costs
subject to constraints on delivery time, capacity, and network
structure. Such MIP formulations—when optimally solved—
guarantees the least-cost solutions preferred by the planners.
It can, however, be computationally-expensive even for just
the medium-sized problems. A linear relaxation may be used
to come up with a feasible solution in polynomial time [?].
A greedy algorithm may also be used to provide an efficient
method for procurement scheduling [6]. The greedy approach
is first used to construct the initial sub-solutions to different
scheduling components. The Benders- or column-generation-
based algorithm is then used to optimize the combination of
the lanes. A column-generation-based algorithm solves some
form of a restricted problem with a set of selected columns,
reducing the size of the original problem quite considerably.
Benders-based algorithm, also known as the row-generation-
based algorithm, solves optimization problems in two stages.
In the first stage, the master problem is solved to formulate
some constraints for the sub-problems. In the second stage,
scheduling solution is identified for each sub-problem. Note
that despite the numerous literature on logistics auction, we
found none pertaining to the use of the UCC. Furthermore,
the concept of rolling horizon [7] has been extensively used
for decision making[8][9][10] . Recently, the rolling horizon
concept has also been adopted in transportation and logistics
context [11][12][13].
III. BASIC UCC AUCTION
At the UCC, packages to be delivered to the same zone in
the city centre are consolidated to achieve the economies of
scale. In [1], it is assumed that shippers/carriers are aware of
the potential cost savings they can benefit from when using
the service offered by the UCC for their last-mile deliveries.
It is further assumed that the UCC operates its own resources
to consolidate and deliver orders to the city centre. A profit-
maximizing auction mechanism was proposed for the use of
the UCC’s service in [1]. The proposed auction mechanism
requires the UCC to know only its operational costs, namely
the delivery and storage cost. For the sake of simplicity, it is
assumed that the UCC operates homogeneous fleet of trucks.
Therefore, the delivery cost is the cost of operating any truck
to zone z in the city centre and is denoted by cz . The storage
cost, on the other hand, is the cost of storing a unit volume
of package overnight in the warehouse and is denoted by cw.
With these costs known, the mechanism also ensures budget
balance on the resulting allocation.
A. Auction Protocol
To plan for the last-mile deliveries in its nearest upcoming
planning horizon, a UCC will conduct an auction and invite
some shippers/carriers to submit their bids to be considered
in utilizing the last-mile delivery service offered. A bid bi is
defined as a tuple:
[vi; di; ai; `i; pi]
where
 vi is the volume of the package,
 di is the destination of the package which belongs to a
non-overlapping zone z in the city centre,
 ai is the arrival day of the package at the UCC,
 `i is the delivery deadline of the package, and
 pi is the price the bidder is willing to pay the UCC.
B. Winner Determination
When the auction is closed, the UCC would have received
a set of bids B = fbig. It then has to determine the winning
bids and notify their respective bidders. This is equivalent to
determining which bids are to be served such that the profit
of the UCC over its planning horizon is maximized. For that
purpose, our proposed mechanism first computes the sum of
the prices at which the winning bidders would pay the UCC
and then subtracts it by
1) the total storage cost for all the packages delivered not
on their arrival days, and
2) the total delivery cost over the planning horizon,
subject to the following operational restrictions.
1) There are a limited number of trucks.
2) Each truck has a limited capacity.
3) Each truck only serves one zone at a time.
4) There is only one delivery per day per truck.
This gives rise to the following basic winner determination
problem for the first-price auction at the UCC.
Definition 1 (Basic Winner Determination Problem): Let
i, k, z, and t, respectively, be indices of the bids, the trucks,
the zones, and the days over the planning horizon. Let V be
the homogeneous capacity of the trucks. Denoting decisions
on day t whether the i-th bid is delivered using the k-th
truck and whether the k-th truck is deployed to serve the
z-th zone as binary variables xtik 2 X and ytkz 2 Y,
respectively, the basic winner determination problem (WDP)
aims to identify
argmax
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The profit of the UCC is depicted in (1) which constitutes
the objective of the mixed-integer program (MIP) described
in Definition 1. In essence, it is the sum of bid prices paid by
the winning bidders subtracted by the storage costs incurred
and the total delivery cost to various zones on different days.
The storage costs are incurred when deliveries are performed
on any day after and different from the package arrival day
at the UCC. Note that the profit can never be negative, hence
budget balance property is guaranteed. Rejecting all the bids
will result in zero profit, which serves as the lower bound of
the profit. Operational restrictions are enforced by (2)–(6) as
follows.
 The package integrity constraint (2) ensures that every
package is delivered at most once.
 The resource uniqueness constraint (3) ensures that any
truck on any day serves at most one zone.
 The vehicle capacity constraint (4) ensures consolidated
packages fit into the allocated trucks.
 The delivery time constraint (5) ensures that no package
gets delivered before its arrival at the UCC or after its
delivery deadline.
 The resource activation constraint (6) ensures that any
truck on any day with at least one package to deliver is
not idle.
For the simplicity of our further discussions, let us denote
the profit in (1) as
(X;Y) (7)
IV. PROPOSED UCC AUCTION WITH ROLLING HORIZON
Winner determination problem for the basic UCC auction
elaborated in Section III assumes that the planning horizons
of two consecutive UCC auctions never overlap one another.
As established in Section I, this restricts shippers/carriers as
the bidders to compete only for the UCC’s delivery resources
in the immediate period following the winner determination.
In practice, longer planning horizon is often desirable so
as to allow shippers/carriers to bid for delivery resources not
only in the immediate period but also in the subsequent few
periods following the winner determination. Announcement
of the results of each auction—and hence, determination of
the winning and the losing bids—should remain as frequent
so that the losing bidders could have a chance to arrange for
some other means of delivery or to alter their bid prices and
resubmit their bids in the subsequent auction. This gives rise
to the UCC auction with a rolling horizon. The requirements
of longer planning horizon and high-frequency update makes
the implementation of rolling horizon in the UCC auction an
interesting and significant topic.
As illustrated earlier in Figure 1, winners for the multiple
consecutive delivery periods across the planning horizon are
determined simultaneously at the end of each auction before
the start of the next auction. Upon closing Auction #1, bids
for potential deliveries at any days on Week #1 to Week #4
could have been received and the corresponding winners are
determined simultaneously. While the committed deliveries
on Week #1 are carried out, Auction #2 is accepting bids for
the potential deliveries at any days on Week #2 to Week #5.
At the closure of Auction #2, the winners for deliveries on
Week #2 to Week #5 are determined. Committed deliveries
on Week #2 are then carried out while Auction #3 accepts
bids for deliveries on Week #3 to Week #6. The cycle then
continues. From this illustration, it is clear that the UCC’s
delivery resources in one period are considered in a number
of auctions altogether. The delivery resources for Week #3,
for instance, are considered in 3 consecutive auctions. When
determining the winners of Auction #1, the auctioneer may
intuitively wish to reserve some capacity for profitable bids
yet to come in Auctions #2 and #3 for deliveries on Week
#3. When determining the winners of Auction #3, however,
it is intuitive to use as much remaining capacity as possible
since capacity left unused will no longer have any potential
value.
Motivated by this, we propose herein an augmentation to
the profit expression of the winner determination problem in
Definition 1. This augmentation aims at pricing the unused
capacity with its potential to be allocated to more profitable
bids in upcoming auctions. This is equivalent to introducing
virtual bids to the current auction, which could potentially be
replaced by real bids of equal or higher values in the future
auctions. Other than reserving capacity for highly profitable
future bids, such augmentation additionally allows selection
of few profitable bids in the current auction as the winners
although there may not be enough bids to realize profitable
consolidation at the moment.
Precisely, we adjust the profit function as follows. Let
qtkz denote the potential value of one unit of unused truck
capacity if truck k delivers to zone z at day t and let V tk
denote the remaining capacity of truck k at day t. If ytkz = 1,
the potential value for the remaining capacity of the truck
after the auction is qtkz(V
t
k  
P
i vix
t
ik), and 0 otherwise.
Additionally if truck k does not deliver to any zone in period
t, we assume the potential value is the average potential value
of the full truckload (
P
z q
t
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t
k . Hence, the profit after
adjustment can be expressed as
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where M in (8) is some large constant. In the rolling horizon
implementation, we update the value of V tk in each auction,
replace V in (4) by V tk and (X;Y) by ^(X;Y), then solve
the optimization problem (1)-(6) for new winning bids. This
process is repeated for every auction.
A. Pricing the Unused Capacity
The value of qtkz is a critical parameter in rolling horizon
implementation and has great impact on the performance. A
reasonable value of qtkz can be roughly determined in the
following way. Suppose the distribution of the ratio p=v of
price to volume of bids is available or can be estimated
from historical data, and let F () denote the cumulative
distribution function of the ratio p=v. Then we want to
fill the remaining truck capacity Vk with the bids with the
highest value of price-volume ratio. If the total volume
of the oncoming bids is V , then the best value of q is
F 1(1 Vk=V ), as shown in Figure 2. This value is for the
optimistic case where all bids with the high price-volume
ratio can be consolidated into a truck load. However, this is
almost not possible in reality due to non-splittable volume
of bid and limited number of bids. Therefore, the value of
q in practice should be set smaller than F 1(1   Vk=V )
appropriately.
Fig. 2. Determination of value of potential value rate.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. The UCC
In this section, the efficacy of the proposed UCC auction
with rolling horizon will be demonstrated via computational
experiments. To understand the contribution of the rolling
horizon framework more clearly and easily, we consider a
problem with one zone and one truck with capacity 10. The
planning horizon is 10 weekdays (2 weeks) and the auction
result is released weekly. The delivery cost is deterministic
and equals 10.
B. Bid Generation
For each auction, a total of 30 bids are generated in which
15 bids compete for the UCC’s delivery resources on the first
week of the planning horizon and another 15 for resources
on the second week. The price-to-volume ratio of the bids
is uniformly distributed between 0 and 3.
C. Efficacy of UCC Auction with Rolling Horizon
In our first experiment, we set qt11 = 0 for each t =
1; 2; :::; 5 and qt11 = 1 for each t = 6; 7; :::; 10 and let the
simulation runs for 10 weeks. The truck load on Friday of
the Week #2 to Week #10 are shown in Figure 3(a). The
result of Week #1 is not shown since it is only involved
in one auction and no truck load is committed before. In
the figure, the circles show the truck load committed one
week before the delivery date and the stars show the final
truck load. It can be observed that in most of the days, the
final truck load contains a portion that is committed one
week before the delivery date. For truck load on Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday we can also observe the
similar pattern, which also lead to a weekly total truck load
as shown in Figure 3(b). From Figure 3(b), we can observe
that about half of the weekly truck load are committed one
week before and this is shown specifically by Figure 4. In
the figure, the dash line shows the percentage of the weekly
load that is committed one week before. It can be seen that
around 50% of the total load is committed one week before.
In Figure 4, the solid line also shows the percentage of the
total profit that is due to such load. In most weeks, the solid
line is above the dash line, suggesting that by pricing the
unused capacity properly (i.e. setting qtkz appropriately) the
winning bids chosen one week before are more profitable.
D. Effect of Various Pricing of Unused Capacity
To further show the importance of the potential value
rate, we let qt11 where t = 6; 7; :::; 10 change from 0 to
3.4 while keeping qt11 for each t = 1; 2; :::; 5 to see how
the total revenue (profit) changes with the pricing of the
unused capacity. Since the delivery cost remains the same for
all cases, we just compare revenue contributed by different
types of bids. The result is shown in Figure 5 where the
darker bars at the bottom shows the revenue contributed by
the winning bids for deliveries on the second week of the
planning horizon and the lighter bars on the top corresponds
to the revenue attributable to the winning bids for deliveries
on the first week of the planning horizon. Note that when
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. (a) Truck load of Friday. (b) Weekly total truck load.
Fig. 4. Percentage of profit and truck load committed in advance (i.e. one
week ahead of the actual delivery week).
qt11 = 0, the winning bids are selected exactly according to
(1). As q increases, the revenue contributed by the winners
of the second week’s delivery resource first increases and
then decreases. The total revenue follows the same trend.
When q > 3, all the shipping capacity is reserved for the
very last auction before the delivery date as no bids have
the price-to-volume ratio larger than 3. Therefore, there is
no winning bids for deliveries on the second week of the
planning horizon in such cases, and it is equivalent to run the
auction with one week planning horizon every week without
rolling horizon. Figure 5 also verifies the idea of choosing
value of q described in Section IV. As the expected total
volume of the 15 bids is 22.88, the value of q should be
3  10=22:88 = 1:31 in the ideal case. But due to non-
splittable bid volumes and the small number of bids, the
best value of q appears around 1 which is smaller than 1.31.
Fig. 5. Revenue v.s. value of qt11 for all t = 6; 7; :::; 10.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented auction mechanism with
rolling horizon for the consolidation of last-mile deliveries
into the city centre via an urban consolidation centre (UCC).
To anticipate profitable bids in future auctions, we augment
the profit function of the basic winner determination problem
with additional terms to allow pricing of the unused capacity.
This is essentially equivalent to introducing some virtual bids
to the current auction, which may potentially be replaced by
the real bids in the upcoming auctions.
More scenarios shall be explored in near future, especially
those that represent more practical situations in reality. Many
constraints not covered in this paper need to be considered.
These include warehouse capacity, consolidation preference,
routing consideration, as well as demand uncertainty.
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